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NATO’s Policy in Africa 
Initiated in Sudan, Continued in Libya  
Glen Segell 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a regional security alliance comprising the 
United States, Canada and 24 European states with a treaty agreement to assist each other on the 
basis of one for all and all for one. The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), upon which NATO is based, 
conforms to Chapter VIII Article 52 of the United Nations Charter (1945). It foresaw regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security.1 
Throughout the bipolar two-superpower Cold War, NATO acted under the leadership of the United 
States to counter another regional organization, the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union. NATO 
collaborated with other regional organizations such as CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS that operated 
in the Cold War era but have since ceased to exist. In the post Cold War era of the early 1990s, 
NATO and the United Nations reaffirmed their desire to share a commitment to maintaining 
international peace and security. At that point it was not clear the source or nature of threats to 
peace and security. NATO states prepared for local, regional, and global eventualities. When threats 
emerged the United Nation’s Security Council Resolutions provided NATO with a mandate for 
operations outside of its traditional North Atlantic region in Afghanistan and a framework for the 
NATO training mission in Iraq.2 NATO also undertook disaster relief operations in Pakistan and 
escorted merchant ships carrying the World Food Programme’s humanitarian supplies to Somalia. 
Other regional organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the Africa Union (AU) adopted 
peace and security mechanisms in their own regions even though they had primarily been created for 
economic considerations. NATO and these regional organisations were like-minded in sharing 
similar goals which saw joint operations. This was first witnessed in the Balkans (1995-2004) 
between NATO and the EU and in Sudan (2005) between NATO and the AU. Consequently 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept was adopted at the Summit meeting in Lisbon (November 2010) 
stressing that NATO develop new capabilities and partnerships.3  
The NATO operation in Libya is a continuation of this policy in three aspects 1) its desire to 
maintain international peace and security, 2) its desire to do so in collaboration with the United 
Nations and other regional organisations, 3) and its policy in the North Africa region resulting from 
its first mission to Africa (Sudan 2005) for humanitarian purposes. On the first two, NATO 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya implemented United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1973 (17 March 2011).4 It called for UN member states and regional organisations to take ―all 
necessary measures‖ to protect citizens in Libya. In doing so NATO did nothing more and nothing 
less than meeting its obligations under the United Nations Resolution – no NATO ground troops 
participated in the operation.5 The latter is the most important to detail why NATO decided to 
become involved in Libya and will continue to be involved both in Africa and in collaborating with 
other regional security alliances. 
                                                          
1 United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 52, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml (2 
December 2012) 
2 NATO’s relations with the UN, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm  (2 Decemnber 2012) 
3 NATO adopts new strategic concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68172.htm  (2 December 2012) 
4 United Nations Security Council, SC/10200, 17 March 2011, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm  (2 December 2011) 
5 NATO and Libya, Operation Unified Protector, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm?  (2 
December 2011) 
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No NATO treaty obligates its member states if there is no direct threat to a NATO member state. 
Yet, this is exactly what took place in Sudan and was replicated in Libya. From April 2005 to 
December 2007, NATO agreed to provide airlift, logistics, training, and related support to the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) which was deployed to the Darfur region on humanitarian 
grounds. The main contributing NATO countries were the United States, United Kingdom, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany. In the deployment of NATO forces, there was no mention 
of which article of which treaty was being invoked. Hence, NATO and the African Union (AU) did 
not have any formal relations except on the functional level. Similarly in Libya NATO operations 
were launched on humanitarian considerations. No formal relations existed between NATO or any 
of its member states with any of the Libyan rebel forces. Although NATO forces are not currently 
engaged in operations in either Sudan or Libya, it is important to understand how and why NATO 
first became involved in the region, why it did so on humanitarian considerations and to maintain 
international peace and security, why it collaborated with another regional security alliance and why 
it would do so again.  
 
The formulation of NATO policy to humanitarian intervention in Africa  
The Darfur region of Sudan is no different from other parts of Africa, or indeed the world, that 
have faced tribal conflict for centuries over the territorial imperatives related to the ownership, 
settlement or usage of land and water. British colonial rule over the region from the late 19th to mid 
20th century was unable to ameliorate this particular conflict. More recently, conflict erupted in 
Darfur in February 2003 when local rebels in Darfur took up arms, complaining of discrimination 
and oppression by Sudan’s Arab-dominated government. The government was accused of 
unleashing Arab tribal militia, known as the Janjaweed, against civilians in a campaign of murder, 
rape and arson. In 2008, the president of Sudan was faced with an indictment from the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and crimes against humanity. During the period of NATO 
assistance to the AU, between 2005 and 2007, the conflict could be described as low-intensity in 
military terms between local armed groups, militias, the armed forces of Sudan and Chad, and bandit 
groups sponsored by both sides. Accurate figures are hard to come by, but there is little doubt that 
by 2005, when the AU requested NATO assistance, there were few left in Darfur who had not felt 
the conflict. The international attention in 2005 focused predominately on internally displaced 
persons (IDP), refugees in neighbouring Chad, and atrocities inflicted on civilians on a scale and 
magnitude that required outside intervention. 
The event that initiated NATO involvement commenced formally on 26 April 2005. It was well 
known at the time that NATO member states had been expressing deep concern since 2003 over 
the conflict in Darfur and atrocities against civilians. They were uncertain on how to ameliorate the 
situation but were engaged in ongoing diplomatic efforts, especially at the United Nations (UN). 
Numerous debates and limited sanctions were levelled at the Sudanese government, yet  the Security 
Council was unable to pass a resolution to authroize armed intervention. A permanent member of 
the Council, China, had shown reluctance to see such a resolution and would probably have vetoed 
it if one had been proposed. However, the AU had reached agreement amongst its members to send 
a peacekeeping force – AMIS – based on provisions of its Constitutive Act that permitted it to do 
so. However, the AU lacked the capabilities to deploy this force and AMIS lacked the necessary 
experience to undertake the mission.6  
                                                          
6 Glen Segell, ―The United Nations Africa Union Mission in Darfur – UNAMID‖, Strategic Insights, Volume VII, Issue 1, 
February 2008 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Feb/segellFeb08.pdf (12 October 2011). 
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It was no surprise that on 26 April 2005 the AU requested assistance, in a letter from the Chairman 
of the Commission of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konaré to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer. The letter requested NATO logistics assistance to expand the AMIS force aimed at ending 
violence in Darfur and improving the humanitarian situation. At the same time, the European Union 
(EU) received a similar request. In clarification of the letter of request, Mr. Konaré, visited NATO 
Headquarters on 17 May 2005 – the first ever visit to the headquarters by an AU official. 
It is important to stress that this was the first time in NATO’s history that another regional political-
security alliance with no NATO members had requested such humanitarian assistance . It therefore 
appeared that no NATO member state had any obligation to commit forces to NATO and that 
NATO had no treaty obligation to provide any assistance. Sudan was not within the regional remit 
of NATO’s operations and no NATO member state faced any direct security or defence threat from 
what was taking place in Darfur. However, it was also apparent at the time that it would be hard 
pressed for NATO to resist providing some form of assistance to the AU, given the magnitude of 
atrocities and the inability or lack of willingness of anyone else to take action.  
It could be assumed that the leadership of NATO would be intricately involved in the intervention. 
A study analysing the speeches of De Hoop Scheffer shows that he was a cautious public advocate 
for extensive and sustained NATO operations in Darfur.7 This was despite his openly favoured 
position that the world could not turn a blind eye to atrocities against civilians. Despite his caution, 
he was an instrumental arbiter in the ongoing debate among European states over whether  NATO 
should be the sole forum for military cooperation or whether the EU should assume a more 
prominent role. 
When the request of the AU was made known to NATO member states, they took the same 
position they had for many years: the best way to deliver security to Darfur was through those with 
the primary responsibility to do it – the government of Sudan. However, they also knew that the 
government of Sudan was not going to do this and, indeed, was the cause of the problem. This 
posed a dilemma over which international actors should assume responsibility for protecting 
civilians being killed as a direct result of Sudanese government policies. After the problems 
experienced in Iraq, NATO states were reluctant to pursue policies of ―regime change‖. Taking this 
into consideration, on 27 April 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) asked the Alliance’s military 
authorities to provide, as a matter of urgency, advice on possible NATO support to the AU and, if 
possible, whether this could also be done in co-ordination with the EU. This advice was prepared in 
full consultation, transparency and complementarity with the AU, the EU and the UN.  
On 24 May 2005, the NAC, after receiving advice from NATO military authorities, agreed on initial 
military options for possible NATO support. These options included support to the AU in the areas 
of strategic airlift deployment, training (for example in command and control and operational 
planning), and improving the intelligence capabilities of the AU mission in Darfur.8 Such support 
did not include the provision of combat troops. In announcing this, De Hoop Scheffer  said that 
NATO ―will consult in the coming days with the AU and others on how to transform these initial 
offers into concrete proposals responding to a specific request‖.9 The Secretary General stressed that 
                                                          
7 Ryan C. Hendrickson, ―Public Diplomacy at NATO: An Assessment of Jaap De Hoop Scheffer’s Leadership of the 
Alliance‖, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2005-2006, Volume 8 Issue 2 2-28. 
8 NATO Documents, NATO Secretary General Pledges Darfur Support, 26 May 2005 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/05-may/e0526a.htm (12 October 2011). 
9 Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer after the Plenary Meeting of the EAPC Security 
Forum, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050525j.htm (12 October 2011). 
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the AU remained ―in the driving seat to solve this difficult conflict and that the Alliance’s role is to 
contribute to strengthening the AU’s capability to meet this challenge‖.10 
An elaboration of De Hoop Scheffer’s thinking and NATO’s policy and strategy towards Africa 
highlighted that NATO member states no longer believed that they were constrained by the treaty 
obligations that had been formulated during the Cold War. NATO member states had voiced their 
intent to undertake some sort of action in the forum of the UN and EU in support of the AU as all 
were concerned about the plight of civilians in Darfur. NATO member states, especially the United 
States, saw NATO as a means to implement what they stood for as sovereign states caring for 
humanity at large. De Hoop Scheffer explained that Darfur showed the need for close cooperation 
between international organisations as an element of what he called ―modern security‖, and that 
Darfur showed that the international community was ready to support the AU. As a result, NATO 
commenced a non-combatant military operation in close consultation and in coordination with the 
EU, the UN and the AU.  
The lessons of Iraq were noted and it was clear that any military operation would have to take into 
account the government of Sudan. The situation in Darfur was a direct consequence of  Sudanese 
government policy. NATO was not intending to embark on a change of regime in Sudan. Yet 
NATO would airlift foreign forces onto the sovereign territory of Sudan to protect and engage in 
efforts against the policy of the government of Sudan and its implementation by the Sudanese armed 
forces. So NATO made clear that it would only implement its policy once the government of Sudan 
had given the green light to the AU. This was a difficult issue since there was no direct relationship 
between NATO and the government in Khartoum, and there was also no intention of establishing 
one. Furthermore, the largest potential contributor, the United States, had a dichotomy of interests 
as 1) it wished to maintain Khartoum as an ally in the war on terror, and 2) it believed that genocide 
was being perpetrated in Darfur.11  
These factors were not considerations for the AU. The founding documents of the AU, signed in 
2000, establishes ―the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of 
the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity‖.12 Although the AU favours African solutions for Africa, it is also pragmatic, and this was 
one such situation where it recognised that it needed help from other international and regional 
organisations. 
When NATO announced its decision to provide non-combatant military support to the AMIS 
mission, six former foreign ministers from different countries wrote a joint newspaper article 
showing moral support for the ethics of NATO’s intended action. They called for NATO to use its 
Rapid Response Force. This was not beyond the will of NATO member states, but it would require 
authority from the UN Security Council for a Chapter VII resolution, especially to declare a no-fly 
zone over Darfur. It was clear, however, that China would oppose this. So NATO pursued the basic 
option of logistical airlift support and training.13 
                                                          
10 Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer after the Plenary Meeting of the EAPC 
Security Forum, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050525j.htm (12 October 2011). 
11 Brian Raftopoulos and Karin Alexander (eds.), Peace in the Balance: The Crisis in Sudan (London: African Minds, 2008), 
84. 
12 Africa Union, Constitutive Act of the Union, Article (h) 4, 11 July 2000 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm (12 October 2011). 
13 Statement by former Madeleine Albright (USA), Robin Cook (UK), Lamberto Dini (Italy), Lloyd Axworthy (Canada), 
Ana Palacio (Spain), Erik Derycke (Belgium), and Surin Pitsuwan (Thailand), International Herald Tribune, 25 May 2005, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/opinion/edalbright.php (12 October 2011). 
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While the diplomatic process pressed on, the North Atlantic Council turned to General James Jones, 
then the Supreme Allied Commander Europe  (SACEUR), asking him to take the lead in putting a 
liaison team on the ground to support the mission. General Jones looked to his command centre in 
Heidelberg, Germany, and asked Allied Land Component Command Headquarters (ALCC HQ 
HD) to take the lead in providing a liaison team on the ground. He chose Brigadier General Andre 
Defawe, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to be his Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO). 
The other Heidelberg members of the liaison team were Sergeant Major Pascal Wijkman (Senior 
NCOIC), Lieutenant Colonel Carsten Petersen (Operations Cell Director) and Lieutenant Colonel 
Ed Mead (Military Assistant to the SMLO).14 
Operationally, the NATO mission was undertaken by Joint Command Lisbon, Portugal – under the 
overall command of Allied Command Operations – where the local responsibility for the NATO 
SMLO team operating from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The SMLO team was NATO’s single military 
point of contact in Addis Ababa with the AU. In addition, it was NATO's military point of contact 
with the representatives of the various countries contributing troops to the AMIS operation, the 
representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the AU, as well as the UN, the EU, and 
various embassies. 
While the military machinery was being put into place—predominately US Air Force transport 
aircraft—the diplomatic process continued. The NATO Secretary General participated in a meeting 
in Addis Ababa on 26 May 2005, chaired by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and AU 
Commission President Konaré, where he pledged international support for the AU’s mission in 
Darfur.  
Following that meeting, and based on further clarification and confirmation of the AU’s 
requirements—as well as consultations with the AU, the EU and the UN—the NATO NAC agreed 
on 8 June on the detailed modalities and extent of Alliance support. The decision to support the AU 
with strategic deployment and staff capacity building was formally announced on 9 June, at the 
meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence in Brussels.15 
 
Implementing the strategy and policy 
Despite the agreement in principle to provide support to the AU, it was not as straightforward in 
implementing it. A few days before the 9 June NATO announcement, an open split broke out 
between those states favoring an EU option and those favouring a NATO option on which 
organisation should coordinate measures in support of AMIS.16 In particular the United States (US) 
and Canada preferred NATO (through SHAPE, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), 
given that the US and Canada were not EU members, while France preferred the EU.17 The United 
Kingdom (UK) was amenable to both the EU and NATO, since the UK was already providing 
direct financial assistance to AMIS (£32 million in 2004 which increased to £52 million in 2006), as 
well as a chief police expert from  the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to advise the AU 
police commissioner on the AMIS mission's civil policing aspects.18 Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Norway remained undecided. An important factor for the European members of NATO who 
                                                          
14 Africa Development Information Service, NATO Organisation Record, 
http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_56574.html (12 October 2011). 
15 Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 9 June 2005, Final Communique, 
paragraph 9 NATO Press Release (2005)076.   
16 D. Dombey, ―NATO-EU Spat hits Airlift to Darfur‖, Financial Times, 8 June 2005, p.4. 
17 Editorial, NATO’s Darfur Mission on as Partners deny Split, The East Standard (Kenya) 11 June 2005. 
18 DFID Press Release, 18 July 2006 http://dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressrelease/amis-brussels.asp (12 October 2011). 
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preferred the EU above NATO was that, unlike NATO, the EU Rapid Reaction Force had a 
defined purpose that included humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations. The EU had been 
helping the AU since 2004 when NATO had not appeared particularly interested in Africa. The EU 
also had recent experience on the African continent: Operation Artemis (June-September 2003) in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which sent 1,700 troops to secure the town of Bunia, 
allowing the return of 60,000 refugees.19  
The escalating situation on the ground in Darfur was the deciding factor which shortened the 
disagreement, leading both the EU and NATO to provide support to the AU-led military group in 
Addis Ababa, with the choice of organisations (EU or NATO) being left to individual member 
states of both regional organisations.20 Given that United States would provide most of the aircraft 
for the airlift operations, it was clear that NATO would be the main airlift-supporting organisation 
to AMIS. France worked solely through the EU, while the UK worked through both the EU and 
NATO.21 Other countries, like Norway and the Netherlands, provided vehicles and equipment as 
part of their commitment to both the EU and NATO. 
There was open relief in NATO over the quick resolution to the quarrel, and throughout the 
mission there was complete transparency between the EU and NATO. Despite this, there remained 
some apprehension that the Berlin Plus framework had not been invoked – this being the December 
2002 agreement between the EU and NATO regarding cooperation on international security. The 
Berlin Plus agreement was seen as essential to European regional security, given that the 
membership of both organisations overlapped to a great extent and that the EU Rapid Reaction 
Force and the NATO Rapid Reaction Force would draw from the same limited pool of deployable 
European forces and equipment. Such apprehension on the availability of forces was exemplified by 
the commitment, if not the over-commitment, to other ongoing conflicts, including Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and peace-support operations in the Balkans. 
The Berlin Plus agreement was significant for NATO assistance to the AU, given the perceived need 
for a common NATO-EU planning centre or chain of command. However, establishing a common 
command centre could have distracted and delayed assisting the AU by months or even years. 
NATO consequently planned through SHAPE, while the EU used the Strategic Airlift Coordination 
Centre (SALCC) in Eindhoven, Netherlands. Any apprehension was short-lived since on the 
ground, the military achieved tactical cooperation to ensure mission success and, within a few weeks, 
Darfur was being presented as a perfect example of NATO-EU cooperation in assisting the AU.22 
The longer-term ramifications are still be to be evaluated, especially on whether both the EU and 
NATO could have done more at the time and how they could do it better in the future.  
Turning back to the case, cooperation on the ground between the AU, EU, and NATO started 
when the NATO liaison team from ALCC HQ arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in mid-June 2005 
and immediately began to set up the NATO/AMIS liaison headquarters. The mandate from the 
SACEUR was to liaise with the AU and Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), which was co-located 
with the AU Headquarters in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, and coordinated support in three specific areas:  
1) strategic airlift (deployment of AMIS forces into Darfur);  
                                                          
19 Lee Feinstein, Darfur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2007), 33. 
20 Editorial, NATO Agrees on Darfur and sets aside strains with the EU, AFP, 9 June 2005.  
21 ISIS Europe European Security Review, Support for the African Union in Darfur: A Test for EU-NATO Strategic Partnership 
(London: ISIS, June 2005), Review no. 26. 
22 Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, ―A Changing Alliance in a Changing World‖, speech at Bratislava, 30 June 2005, ISIS Europe 
European Security Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050630a.htm (12 October 2011). 
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2) support of the UN-led map exercise (MAPEX); and  
3) execution of staff capacity-building training for the DITF staff and the force headquarters.23 
In a rapid display of capability, NATO was able to launch its airlift operations in support of AMIS 
with the first movement of Nigerian troops on 1 July. This was achieved by having NATO 
personnel deployed on the ground to coordinate NATO’s airlift support. In reality, this only 
required eight people – seven in Addis Ababa and one in Nigeria. These were later transferred to 
other countries based on the airlift schedule. Airlifts of personnel from Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa continued through July, August and September. The initial airlift 
was performed by United States C-130 and C-17 and carried approximately 680 troops to the region, 
while the United Kingdom later supported the airlift of another 680 troops.24 
Thus, the first task of NATO support to the AU, immediate and decisive strategic airlift, was 
successful within a three-month period. Integral to the success was the movement and control 
specialists and the NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer team. The latter succeeded in the main 
task to coordinate the planning and execution of cargo and troops between the troop contributing 
nations (TCN), the DITF Headquarters and various NATO air movement centres. On paper, the 
task seemed easy and the numbers seemed relatively small. However, it was a complex task because 
the troop movements had to be coordinated around eleven different Aerial Ports of Embarkation 
(APOE) and three different Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APOD).25 It was clear that NATO was 
thus able to engage in a trans-regional military support operation in Africa without previous 
expertise. 
This foray into Africa intrigued the world, and NATO was publicly questioned by the press over 
which NATO Treaty was being invoked, which NATO member state was being threatened and, if 
none, then why NATO was becoming involved in Africa. Jamie Shea (NATO Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General for External Relations) responded,  
NATO needs to use its forces in a reasoned manner with clear objectives which might 
not only include active conflict but also situations to address human indignities 
certainly as in Darfur, and I think that it's very appropriate that we do have that 
involvement in a contingency like Darfur.26 
While the airlift was underway, NATO commenced its second task – that of staff capacity-building 
training. The NATO liaison team for this task worked with the DITF staff leadership and the 
tactical commanders on the ground to collect the staff capacity-building training requirements. A 
plan was formulated, and NATO responded by providing two phases of training, targeting two 
different training audiences. 27  
The first phase was conducted in August 2005 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the DITF Headquarters 
and was designed to train the DITF staff members on strategic level tasks. The second phase of the 
training was conducted in El-Fashir, Sudan, at the AMIS Force Headquarters compound and was 
                                                          
23 NATO Documents, NATO starts Airlifting African Union Troops to Darfur, 1 July 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/07-july/e0701a.htm (12 October 2011). 
24 NATO Documents, 1,300 African Union Peacekeepers Airlifted to Darfur, 3 August 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/08-august/e0803a.htm (12 October 2011). 
25 NATO Documents, NATO Starts Airlifting African Union Troops to Darfur, 1 July 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/07-july/e0701a.htm (12 October 2011). 
26 NATO Documents, The Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century, 11 July 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050711i.htm (12 October 2011). 
27 NATO Documents, NATO Starts Airlifting African Union Troops to Darfur, 1 July 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/07-july/e0701a.htm (12 October 2011). 
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designed to train the Force Headquarters on operational and tactical level tasks. This training was 
widely accepted and in total, 114 Force Headquarters and Sector Headquarters staff officers were 
trained from all the combined Force HQ components (Military, Civilian Police, CIMIC and NGOs). 
NATO support was not confined solely to supporting the AU directly. As part of the initial 
diplomacy, it was clear that NATO would support UN initiatives to the AU as well as the EU in its 
assistance to the AU. As regards NATO support to the EU in its assistance to the AU, it was on 7 
August that NATO airlifted the first team of 49 AU civilian police as well as an additional 533 
military peacekeepers into Darfur.28 
Given these successes in airlift support and training, NATO then turned to the third critical mission 
that was requested. This was NATO support to the UN-led map exercise (MAPEX) designed to 
help AU personnel understand the theatre of operations and operate effectively within it, as well as 
to build their capacity to manage strategic operations.29 
Towards the end of August 2005, staff capacity-building activities started in Nairobi, Kenya. NATO 
helped to train AU personnel in key headquarters functions such as command and control, logistics, 
and planning. The UN asked NATO for assistance in helping to write the scenarios for the exercise 
and then to provide exercise controllers both in the Force Headquarters and the Sector 
headquarters. In a cost-effective operation, only sixteen NATO personnel were deployed to conduct 
the exercise and another eight to organise the staff capability building. In the words of both the AU 
and UN leadership during the exercise and in the after action review, ―NATO involvement and 
participation in the MAPEX was pinnacle to the success of the entire operation.‖30  
Thus, within six months of the initial request and within three months of the start of operations, a 
unique milestone was established. This was the first time that NATO was involved in an operation 
on the African continent where the NATO contingent was accepted as a full partner by the AU 
leadership and the collective group of partner nations from the AU, the EU and the UN. This 
resulted in the appointment of a NATO Civilian Senior Representative (NCSR) from the Norwegian 
embassy in Ethiopia on an informal basis to assist with the political contacts and to work directly 
with NATO Headquarters. Clearly, this particular NATO mission opened a whole new array of 
opportunities for the NATO alliance and cast a very positive light on its member states’ intentions 
to the international community  
Given this state of affairs, it was no surprise that on 21 September 2005 that the North Atlantic 
Council agreed to extend the duration of NATO’s airlift support in order to ensure the airlift of the 
remaining peacekeeping reinforcements in Darfur until 31 October 2005.  
 
Sustaining the strategy and policy 
The rapidity of the decision to support the AU had not left time to justify the actions to an eager 
public audience nor to undertake an introspective review of the decision and the initial 
implementation successes. In a show of transparency, an open discussion panel was therefore 
                                                          
28 NATO Documents, First NATO Airlift of Civilian Police into Darfur, 7 August 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/08-august/e0810b.htm (12 October 2011). 
29 NATO Speeches, ―Back-round Briefing by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on the Upcoming 
Ministerial Meeting in Sofia Bulgaria‖, 25 April 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060425a.htm (12 
October 2011). 
30 NATO Documents, News, http://www.nato.int/lahd/news/2006/n060317a.htm (12 October 2011). 
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organised on 30 September 2005 with the topic ―NATO, the AU, the UN and Darfur‖.31 The panel 
was chaired by Jamie Shea, with a panel of Eirini Lemos (resident UN expert on the NATO 
international staff), Dr. Klaus Becher (Associate Director of Wilton Park, UK) and Professor Mats 
Berdal (Kings College London). The panel highlighted that the policy was not a spontaneous 
decision. It had been clearly defined in political terms with military participation. The military had 
been given the ability and capability to undertake the mission. Strategic and tactical goals were clearly 
defined and limitations were clearly demarcated. The panel accepted that NATO’s success meant 
that it could expect more such requests in the future and it would be hard pressed to reject them, 
given this precedence.  
Since the NATO contribution to the AU missions had suffered no casualties and even gained 
immense public support following the panel discussion, the NAC agreed on 30 September 2005 to 
continue to offer support to the AU until 31 March 2006. The policy and strategy remained the 
same – the coordination of strategic airlift during further troop rotations of the peacekeeping forces 
as well as additional staff capacity building, in order to add to the military skills of the AU officers. 
Having reviewed the AU troop rotation schedule on 9 November 2005, the NAC amended this 
support until end May 2006.32 
Ultimately, NATO relies on its member states commitments and such decisions required high-level 
political consent. Clearly, the pressure was on for more to be attempted in Darfur. For example, on 
17 February 2006 President Bush called for a sizeable UN force and a bigger role for NATO in the 
peacekeeping effort.33 Similarly, the United Kingdom’s International Development Secretary 
frequently suggested that Darfur ―represented the most serious humanitarian emergency in the 
world today‖.34 
Hence, by mid-March 2006, Pentagon authorities were tasked with and had completed a review of 
various options, and were ready to back sending a large team of NATO advisers to Darfur. Secretary 
of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was briefed on the proposal and approved it for discussion with the 
White House and State Department. However, a larger force with a different mandate was never 
approved. A number of reasons were cited. Foremost, NATO relied solely on contributing member 
states; no single member state was willing to make a significant increase in forces, arguing that 
NATO as an alliance had a growing role in securing Afghanistan, and Darfur might distract from 
this role.35 Another concern was the fear that sending significant numbers of Europeans and North 
Americans could inflame regional sensitivities, particularly if the mainly Muslim Sudanese 
government opposed such a NATO deployment. This fear in part emanated from an Osama bin 
Laden tape that accused the United States of igniting strife in Darfur. Last, but not least, was the 
minimal domestic interest in Western countries about Darfur, in the sense that political elites 
perceived that they would neither gain nor lose any electoral or popular support by either invoking a 
smaller or larger military commitment through NATO or unilaterally. It was no surprise when 
NATO HQ announced on 29 March that NATO was neither planning, discussing, nor considering 
a NATO armed force on the ground in Darfur, though NATO would continue to provide what it 
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was already providing.36 
It was at this stage that the UN escalated its efforts. First, the UN Security Council, for the first 
time, imposed sanctions on Sudan regarding issues relating to atrocities in Darfur. Secondly, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan formally appealed to NATO by way of a phone call to the NATO 
Secretary General on 27 March for help in fortifying the ability of the AU force to restrain armed 
groups and to ensure the safety of civilians.37 Lacking the mandate from a UN Security Council 
Resolution, all that the NAC could do was announce its readiness to continue NATO’s current 
mission. The formal statement to this effect came on 13 April, when the NAC announced its 
readiness to continue NATO’s current mission until 30 September 2006 in full consultation, 
transparency and complementarity with the EU, the UN and all other donors concerned.38 
Despite the good intentions and successes, all those involved knew that more was needed, and on 30 
May 2006 the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Egeland, visited 
NATO HQ to discuss Darfur and the role of the military in disaster relief. This was complemented 
on 2 June when the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, requested that 
NATO extend its airlift and training support. The NAC consulted the contributing NATO member 
states and decided to extend NATO’s assistance to AMIS until the end of 2006. 
Affirming this on 8 June 2006, NATO Defence Ministers stated NATO’s willingness to expand its 
training assistance to AMIS in the fields of Joint Operations Centres, pre-deployment certification, 
and lessons learned. They also stated NATO’s willingness to consider support to an anticipated 
follow-on UN mission to the AMIS mission.39 This follow-on AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping mission 
was at the time in the planning stage but was formally announced on 16 November 2006 in Addis 
Ababa, and would later be officially created in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (31 August 
2006). It would come into being on 1 January 2008 as UNAMID when AMIS was disbanded. 
Egeland’s efforts were successful to the extent that his initiatives were in time to be placed on the 
agenda of the NATO Riga Summit held on 28-29 November 2006. At the Riga Summit, NATO 
reaffirmed its support to the AU and its willingness to broaden this support. It also reiterated its 
commitment to coordinating with other international actors and regional alliances. 
Some 18 months after the first lift, NATO decided to extend its support mission for six additional 
months. This was after a meeting on 15 December 2006 between the Secretary General of NATO, 
Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, and US Ambassador Andrew Natsios, US Special Envoy to Darfur. 
Ambassador Natsios had just returned from an extensive mission in the region. They discussed the 
security and humanitarian situation in and around Darfur and concluded that any larger NATO 
commitment would be expensive, difficult due to the terrain especially the lack of water, could not 
be set up in a hurry and would be met by strong resistance from the government of Sudan who 
might view it as an act of war.40 Having concluded that a NATO reaction force intervention was not 
possible, other options for enhanced support were considered, and on 15 January 2007 NATO 
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announced that it would provide staff capacity training at the AU Mission HQ in Khartoum, in 
addition to training provided in El Fasher and Addis Ababa.41  
 
Conclusion 
Drawing a line on the chronology of NATO involvement in Sudan is possible, since AMIS was 
disbanded and replaced by a United Nations force (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007. However 
NATO continued to assist the AU. Shortly after the termination of the Sudan mission, NATO 
began to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).42 Assistance to the African 
Union has also continued in capacity building support to its long term peacekeeping capabilities, in 
particular to the African Standby Force (ASF). NATO coordinates it assistance missions principally 
with the United Nations and the European Union, but is also expanding such missions to include 
bilateral partners as well.  
From March to October 2011, NATO Operation Unified Protector in Libya implemented United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The Sudan and Libyan missions shared several 
similarities: 1) NATO did not provide combat troops on the ground, 2) the decision to be involved 
was based on concerns for the lives of individuals who were unable to defend themselves, i.e. 
humanitarian reasons, 3) there were no relations nor contact between NATO and the governments 
of the states were the NATO air forces were used, 4) the deployment of military force was 
authorized by a United Nations mandate, and 5) there was collaboration with other regional security 
alliances.  
Inherent to NATO’s policy are three factors 1) its desire to maintain international peace and 
security, 2) its desire to do so in collaboration with the United Nations and regional security alliances 
3) its desire to be involved in the Africa region on humanitarian considerations. The successful 
outcome of such missions and operations show that regional security alliances such as NATO have 









About the Author 
Glen Segell is the editor of the London Security Policy Study at the Oxford University Strategic Studies 
Group. 
                                                          
41 NATO Documents, NATO’s Assistance to the African Union for Darfur, 2 April 2008, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/darfur/practice.html (12 October 2011). 
42 NATO Documents, African Union looks to long-term cooperation with NATO,http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/03-
march/e0302a.html (12 October 2011). 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 38
